Abstract
Introduction

I
The constrluction of useful• knowledge based systems requires the representation and manipulation of so called commonsense knowledge ClJ.
Commonsense knowledge is very often characterized by pieces of knowledge I that are usuallY. true but not ne�essarily always.true.
Many rules of thu can be considered in this category. Stereotypical characterizations are another e�<ample of this category. Two distinct avenues e>:ist for handlinl these types of knowledge. The first approach is to put this type of commonsense knowledge in to a probabilisti� framework. [2,3,4J.· The second approach is to consider objects typical, having the characteristic in 11 question unless qtherwise informed.
This second approach has been the m 91r This system is rooted in the theory of approximate reasoning 1
This system provides a set based, framework for representing knowledge. We feel this system· provides both· the conceptual simplicity a a well developed reasoning system described as desirable by Imielinski[9J.
In addition it allows for the representation of partial matching and otht methods for handling imprecise information. N i� A is possible. This statement characterizes a piece of information that says our knowle� of the value of V is such that it is· possible <or consistent with it> to assume that V lies in the set A. · Note that it doesn't specifically say V 1 i es in A.
Formally this statement gets translated into
where A+ is a subset of the power set of the base set X.
any subset G of X
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In particular for 
Using our transl ation rules we get
We shall denote ,{A•) as A*� hence we get V is <A* U A>. Furthermo r e assume that owr knowl edge base consists simply of the fact that V is B.
Combining this with our typical knowledge we get V is D where D = {A* n B> U <A n B>. Since A* is a subset Of the power set of X and B is a sub set of X we convert B into a sub set of the power set, thus B = {1/B}.
A* n B = < <1 -Poss[A/BJ ) I B} which in turn can be e x pressed as a subset of X, M, where
Two extremal cases should be noted. Thus when our typical knowledge doesn't contradict our firm knowledge we conjunct these sources of knowledge.
In the special case when B is unknown, B = X, then we get V is A. If all we know is V is C then we should infer U is a-.
Complementary Default Rules
If we neither A nor C or both A and C then we should report unknown for U.
us see how our structure handles this kind of knowledge.
We represent P1 as If V is A and U is B is possible then U is B similarly for P2 If W is C and U is a-is possible then U is a-. know V is A we correctly infer U is B.
It can be easily shown, in a symmetric manner, if all we know is tha w is c that we infer u is a-.
The final case corresponds to the situation in which we know both V t A and W is C.
In this case we conjunct A fl C with H to get H"
Projecting onto Y we get Projv H" = B<y> U s-<y> = 1, hence in this cas� we get U is "unknown" Thus we see that our system makes the correct inference in the face of complimentary default rules. typically if a person is alive at time t2 he is alive at t� D3:
typically if a person is alive at time t2 and shot at tz and the gun is loaded at tz then their not alive at t3
typically if a person is alive at time tz and shot at tz with a gun that is unloaded at tz then they are alive at t3
We shall use the fDllowing notation A� -a live at time t�; L� -g un loaded at t�; s� -gun shot at t� Using our notation we have the following representation of out knowledge D1: L1 and L::z is possible then L2
Dz: A2 and A3 is possible then A3
D3:
A2 and Sz and Lz and A3 is possible then A-3
D4:
A2 and 82 and not L::z and A3 is possible then A3
This can be formally expressed as D�:
A-z U S-2 U L::z U A� U A3 In addition to these four default rules we have the following three pieces of factual knowledge L1 , Az and Sz.
We now introduce two other pieces of knowledge.
These are two pieces of meta -knowledge with respect to priorities on the introduction of default rules MR-1:
(1) specialization priority
temporal priority
We shall first discuss in turn these two meta priority rules.
Assume we have two default rules:
R1: typically (if A then E)
Rz: typically <if A and B then G> The meta-rule of specialization priority says that Rz has priority over R1, it is introduced first.
In a simplistic way we see for this is that R::z has less potential e>�ceptions than R1, since B is not an e>:ception.
The second rule, �emporal priority, is.closely related to Shoham's concept of chronological ignorance [14] as well as the basic idea of causality. It is a principle useful for knowledge (default rules) that have a predictive nature to them. The essential idea'responsible for this meta priority rule is an assumed causality in the world. The basic idea here is that anything that happens in the world at time t� must be caused by things that happened in the world at times before t�, t � t�. Having discussed these meta rules we are now in a position to make appropriate inferences based upon our knowledge base: commonsense knowledge, facts and meta -priority rules.
The following analysis sets up the appropriate priority schedule. 
